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Abstract: This article assesses the influence of governance and/or institutional structures 
on trade-offs between conservation and development in four villages adjacent to Saadani 
and Ruaha National Parks in Tanzania. The fundamental argument of the article is that, 
existing governance and institutional structures are insufficient in terms of providing a win-
win situation between conservation and people’s livelihoods. This is mainly because of the 
top-down decision making set-up whereby lower organs of authority take what is dictated 
by higher ones which, more often than not, uphold conservation over livelihoods of those 
living next to protected areas. Also, the article identifies winners and losers in conservation 
and development. In light of this argument the article recommends the following: A 
bottom-up approach in formulation of conservation-related policies and/or legislation; 
control of the powers of the President to transfer any area of village land to general or 
reserved land for public interest; enhancement of the village administrative personnel’s and 
local people’s knowledge of conservation and development trade-offs as well as the means 
of calculating and negotiating them so that when and where compensation is provided it is 
fair in terms of providing alternative means of livelihoods.  
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1. Introduction 
The future of biodiversity conservation and the future of local communities living adjacent to 
protected areas are inextricably linked on a global scale (WWF 1999). The Convention on Biological 
Diversity (2004) goes to great lengths to emphasize the importance of protecting biodiversity and the 
livelihoods of people who still depend on direct access to natural resources for their livelihoods. 
Supporters of Community-Based Conservation have also used this linkage in advocating for local 
communities’ rights and building a global indigenous peoples’ movement, but with limited, and 
sometimes self-defeating results (Igoe 2005 & 2006). 
The more professionals become involved in real-world problems, the more politically 
enlightened they become, and realizing that actual prevention of environmental destruction and 
misuses must involve social and political changes (Albee 1982). Too often problems in natural 
resources management and policy are viewed only (or largely) within very narrow conceptions of 
‘positivistic’ science thus creating the misperception that, only biological sciences are required to solve 
them (Brewer and Clark 1994). On the other hand there are debates over the role of democracy in 
enhancing development and regarding human rights-based approaches to development (Thede 2009).  
Decentralization acts as a lens through which the interaction of democratization, development 
and human rights (DDHRs) can be analyzed in concrete local contexts (Thede 2009). DDHRs are 
increasingly recognized to be related processes with complex interactions amongst themselves. 
Development itself is being redefined to reflect its nature as a multidimensional phenomenon, and can 
be construed to mean the full realization of human potential. Democracy is also conceived as key to 
that process and has, since the mid-1990s, become included as a legitimate field for development 
cooperation.  
Striking a win-win balance between biodiversity conservation and social development has 
never been an easy endeavour and it is against such situation that the field of conservation is 
experiencing massive scholarship revolving around analytical tools for trade-offs (McShane & Wells 
2004; Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007; Cheung & Sumaila 2008; Sunderland et al. 2008; Dahlberg & 
Burlando 2009; Nelson et al. 2009). The concept of trade-offs, in its most basic sense, denotes that 
gaining something of value entails losing something else of value.   
Thinking and communicating in terms of trade-offs is a positive step for conservation in that it 
is a move beyond “win-win” rhetoric that, while powerful from the standpoint of gaining funding and 
support, in the long run serves as fuel for a cycle of optimism and then disenchantment as one panacea 
after another fails to live up to its promise (Brosius & Russell 2003; Ostrom 2007; Redford & Adams 
2009). 
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As calls to analyze, measure and calculate trade-offs in conservation are increasingly being 
made and heeded, however, a contradiction has begun to appear. On the one hand, tools and 
procedures to identify and calculate trade-offs between conservation and other social goals help 
conservation professionals confront hard choices and provide methods for doing so. On the other hand, 
trade-off thinking and tools are themselves ways of framing complex conservation problems, and can 
serve to oversimplify the issues in ways that leave out key differences in power, perspective and 
problem understanding. If conceived too narrowly or in an overly technical frame, trade-off analysis 
has the potential to conceal the very elements of a problem that must be confronted in the design and 
implementation of more resilient conservation initiatives. 
This article attempts to assess the political and historical factors that influence conservation and 
development decisions by looking at governance and institutional structures, resource tenure, political 
ideology and legal frameworks and to understand and negotiate trade-offs. In the context of the article, 
trade-off is accepting less of one thing in order to get more of something else. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. The Study Area 
Four study sites (Matipwili and Mkwaja villages both adjacent to Saadani National Park in 
northeastern Tanzania, and Ikoga Mpya and Idunda villages adjacent to Ruaha National Park in 
southern Tanzania) were used as case studies. Matipwili and Mkwaja are administratively in 
Bagamoyo and Pangani Districts respectively and both Ikoga Mpya and Idunda located in Usangu 
plains (Eastern Ihefu Wetland) are administratively in Mbarali District. Regarding the southern 
Tanzania study site, on 15 April 2006 the government of Tanzania issued a notice to ban all livestock 
keeping activities in Ihefu wetland (Ikoga Mpya and Idunda form part of the wetland) and residents 
were forcefully evicted. The wetlands are connected to the Greater Ruaha River and to areas around 
Mtera dam. It is argued that, a critical drought period that seriously affected the country by causing 
shortage of hydro-electric power, food and water for humans, and water and pasture for livestock and 
wildlife was one of the contributing factors to the eviction order. The Ihefu wetlands are one of the 
major sources of water for Great Ruaha River and consequently for two major dams, i.e., Mtera and 
Kidatu, which produce over 80% of electricity in the country (Ngailo et al. 2009). 
 
2.2. Data Collection 
Data were collected through household questionnaire survey, focus group discussions and 
formal discussions with government officials from village level to national level and archive data 
reviews as detailed below. 
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2.2.1. Household questionnaire surveys 
In each of the four villages, thirty (30) households were selected from the village register using 
a systematic random sampling technique. This followed training of research assistants and 
questionnaire pre-testing. A total of 102 households (85% of the target) in the four villages responded 
to the questionnaires. The same questionnaire was administered in Matipwili and Mkwaja villages – 
covering socio-economic, governance structures, political ideology, land tenure, legal frameworks and 
customary law aspects. However, the one administered in Ikoga Mpya and Idunda, apart from covering 
similar aspects as those in Matipwili and Mkwaja, had slight modification by including questions 
related to eviction.  
In Idunda village, the affected (evicted) households, though already compensated, were still in 
the park whereas in Ikoga they had already moved to a new area, which they named Ikoga Mpya. 
Survey aspects covered for those still in the park included socio-economic, relocation logistics, reasons 
for relocation, impacts, compensation and suggestions which could minimize conflicts in the future. 
Those who had already relocated were probed on socio-economic issues, compensation, availability of 
basic infrastructure, problems they faced, participation, positive and negative impacts and suggestions 
which could minimize conflicts. 
2.2.2. Formal discussions with conservation stakeholders  
The visits were meant to get views of key conservation stakeholders both at national and 
district levels. In addition, visits at the district headquarters allowed the authors to acclimatize 
themselves and have interviews with district officials such as District Commissioners, District 
Executive Directors and District Planning Officers.  
2.2.3. Focus group discussions 
Focus group discussions were organised and run by the authors. The focus groups involved 
different social groups, including the youth (18-34), adults (35-54), elders (>54) and victims of the 
eviction in Ihefu (pupils and adults). The groups comprised 8-12 people. For pupils, a group comprised 
of three.   
2.2.4. Literature review and secondary data collection 
Publications relevant to the research topic and to the study areas were accessed from libraries 
and government offices. These included conceptual materials on ideas, debates and issues relevant to 
the subject matter. 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Socio-economic Characteristics of the Study Area 
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Socio-economic characteristics of the study areas are presented in Table 1 below. The main 
economic activity in all four villages was agriculture, which, on average, was practiced by 85% of the 
populations. However, in Mkwaja village, the proportion of those engaged in agriculture was 
comparable to those engaged in fishing. Mkwaja village is located on the Indian Ocean coast. In terms 
of education, very few (5%) had secondary education and above. This implies higher illiteracy level. 
High level of education is argued to be instrumental in ones effort to eradicate poverty as he can apply 
his level education to initiate alternative livelihood options with easy when compared to a person with 
low level of education (Ngailo et al., 2007). 
 
Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of the study area  
Village N Sex (%) Age (%) Education (%) Economic activities 
(%) 
Main ethnic 
group 
M F 18-34 35-54 >54 Pr Sec Ab Ag Lv Fish Ethnic 
Idunda 24 58 42 21 63 16 96 4 0 100 0 0 Sangu 
Ikoga Mpya 29 48 52 31 59 10 94 6 0 99 1 0 Hehe 
Mkwaja 26 62 38 12 69 19 89 8 3 52 6 42 Zigua 
Matipwili 23 74 26 48 50 2 92 8 0 90 10 0 Doe 
Average 26 61 39 28 60 12 93 5 2 85 4 11  
N=sample size M=male F=female; Pr=primary; Sec=secondary Ab=above secondary Ag=agriculture  Lv=livestock 
Fish=Fishing 
 
3.2. Conservation Governance and/or Institutional Structures 
Governance structures and/or institutions at national and local levels were explored through 
household questionnaire survey, literature reviews and discussions with government officials at 
national and district levels. At national level the government puts conservation mandates into central 
and local governments. The central government includes Ministries, parastatal organizations (Tanzania 
National Parks and Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority) and independent departments, while the 
local government includes District Councils, Wards and Village Councils (MNRT 2007).  
According to the Wildlife Policy (MNRT 2007) the central government is to provide clear 
national policy and regulatory frameworks, stimulate and promote participation of various stakeholders 
in the implementation of the policy, manage core wildlife protected areas and oversee the sector’s 
development. On the other hand, local government authorities are to implement this policy. District 
Councils have a role to provide extension services and lead other agencies in the implementation of the 
policy in their areas of jurisdiction through formulating and enforcing by-laws, providing technical 
support and conservation education to villages, and preparing sound physical and development plans 
that protect wildlife resources. Furthermore, the government recognises the role of different 
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stakeholders relating to conservation, management, utilization of wildlife and development of the 
conservation sector. Stakeholders include the private sector, NGOs and the public (MNRT 2007).  
At local level (Table 2), local communities had the view that these structures and/or institutions 
are present (90%; n=102). Governance structures in place include village council offices, ward 
administration, and environmental committees and/or natural resources management committees. 
However, these structures seem to be mal-functioning as observed by 74% of the respondents. Reasons 
put forward for lack of effectiveness were lack of local communities’ involvement in major decisions 
affecting large strata of the communities, and lack of both conservation education and transparency.  
Table 2. Assessment of conservation governance structures at local level 
Village Government 
structures/instit
utions in place 
Type of 
structures/institutions 
Functional? Why mul-functional? 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
Yes 
(%)  
No 
(%) 
Idunda 
89 11 Village government 
office, Ward office, 
environment committee 
20 80 Lack of involvement 
of locals in major 
decisions 
Ikoga 
Mpya 
85 15 Village government 
office, Ward office, 
environment committee, 
natural resources 
management committee 
25 75 Locals not involved 
in decision making, 
illiteracy of village 
leaders 
Mkwaja 
90 10 Saadani National Park, 
environmental 
committee, natural 
resources management 
committee 
30 70 Lack of involvement 
of locals in major 
decisions, lack of 
conservation 
education 
Matipwili 
95 5 Saadani National Park, 
village land committee, 
village executive office, 
Kipaku forest Committee 
29 71 Lack of regular 
meetings and 
transparency  
Average 
90 10 
NA 
26 74 
NA 
NA=Not Applicable 
 
According to the country’s administrative set-up, there are institutional structure linkages at 
national and local levels. However, the relationship is, in most cases, not in harmony mainly because 
of the top-down approach mostly used in decision making. Local level institutional structures are 
treated as recipients of decisions made above without consultation with them. Incompatibility of the 
two levels has been and still is the cause of land use and/or human-wildlife conflicts at local level. It 
can be argued that conservation decisions are made at local and national levels but always at the 
expense of the poor local communities.  
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Examples in Saadani area include the decision by Management of Saadani National Park to 
restrict sand quarrying at Sima and fishing at Funguni (an area reported to be a breeding site for many 
fish species) without providing alternatives. Another example is the eviction of people from Ihefu 
wetland (now part of Ruaha National Park) against their will and/or without meaningful compensation. 
Win-win situation demands participatory decision making. But, in such circumstances, participatory 
decision making can only be achieved if local communities are involved in all major decisions 
affecting their livelihoods.  
A good example of unparticipatory processes is the way natural resource management policies 
and/or legislation are formulated and implemented in Tanzania. In terms of formulation, local 
communities are barely involved. As for policy implementation, the approach used is normally top-
down and worse more the policy documents are rarely accessible and where they are they are always in 
English, which is not a user-friendly language for the intended stakeholders. These scenarios demand 
for links and a two-way communication between the local and national levels in terms of providing 
directives and making policies that are implementable at the lower levels. The idea here is that, there 
should be appropriate relationship in the governance structures whereby the lower levels are informed 
by policies and laws made from above. 
Respondents at village level were asked to suggest mechanisms, which could make governing 
institutions effective. They suggested several strategies, including availability of wild meat (game 
meat), provision of soft loans to enable them to engage in non-farm activities (reduce dependence on 
natural resources), equitable benefit sharing (from park) and the return of Sima and Funguni areas. 
Before it was annexed to Saadani National Park, Sima area used to be the main source of sand for 
construction. Currently the people are denied this opportunity and are forced to use sub-standard sand 
from beaches within the villages. As for Funguni, the area is rich in fish (it is a breeding site for 
several fish species) and fishermen used to get big catches there. Currently they do not have specific 
sites and the sizes of catches are relatively small compared to those at Funguni. Apart from local 
communities’ suggestions, it is the opinion of the authors that devolvement of decision-making powers 
to local communities, involvement of local communities (not just consultations) in major decisions, 
equitable benefit sharing, and enhancement of conservation education can help to achieve both 
conservation and development. 
 
3.3. Land Tenure System, Relocation and Compensation 
Land tenure system was found to be a source of land-use conflicts and a hindrance to 
conservation efforts in the study areas. For example, Ikoga Mpya and Idunda residents (adjacent to 
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Ruaha National Park) were harshly evicted from their native lands thus violating human rights (See 
Table 3).  
Table 3: Views of local communities related to relocation  
Village Compensated? Amount (Tzs ‘000) Problems faced 
Yes 
(%) 
No 
(%) 
< 1 1-5 6-10 
Idunda 95 5 60 30 10 Student’s failure to attend school, low 
compensation, not involved in any 
economic activities for fear of eviction 
any time, no basic infrastructures in 
Mulungu – proposed school to absorb 
them 
Ikoga 
Mpya 
93 7 59 37 4 Low compensation, lack of basic 
infrastructure (schools, water, markets, 
dispensary), lack of farms and renting of 
houses 
Average 94 6 60 34 6  
Tzs=Tanzanian Shilling   
 
The Tanzanian National Land Policy has five statements, which guide land tenure and 
management in Tanzania. They are (i) all land in Tanzania is public land vested in the President as 
trustee on behalf of all Tanzanians, (ii) Land has value, (iii) Rights to land shall not be taken from 
citizens without due process of law and full, fair, and prompt payment of compensation, (iv) Village 
councils will administer village lands, and (v) Mechanisms for protecting sensitive areas such as water 
catchments, islands, beaches, forests, rivers, wildlife migration routes etc. will be established (MLHSD 
1997).  
Details of how the policy is to be implemented and how rights and responsibilities are specified 
are found in the country’s land laws, i.e., Land Act, 1999 and Village Land Act, 1999. In the central 
government, the President designates administrative powers to the Minister for Lands. Land in 
Tanzania is divided into three categories: reserved land (set aside for wildlife conservation etc.), 
village land (subject to Village Land Act) and general land (under management of the Commissioner 
of Lands) (MLHSD 1997). 
The land policy recognises the importance of wildlife, in particular wildlife habitat, by calling 
for revocation of land titles in all wildlife migratory corridors and buffer zones (MLHSD 1996). The 
wildlife policy pronouncements do not, however, effectively address the issue of competition for land 
use in wildlife areas, and particularly buffer zones and migratory corridors. This scenario is caused by 
two main reasons. First, the two policies are focused on wildlife conservation at the potential expense 
of community needs and priorities. Second, they do not recognise local communities as genuine and 
equal partners with government and other stakeholders in wildlife management. 
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The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights details the basic civil 
and political rights of individuals and nations. Among the rights of individuals is the right to legal 
recourse when their rights have been violated, even if the violator was acting in an official capacity 
(ICCPR 1996 available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm). Similar observations were 
raised in Matipwili and Mkwaja villages. Regarding this, one Matipwili resident stated that: 
 
“There is lack of compensation for our lost land. For instance, the Wildlife Division took our 
land at Tengwe in 1972 but we have not been compensated. The same has been repeated by 
TANAPA (Tanzania National Parks). Furthermore, TANAPA has failed to involve us in fixing 
boundaries and as a result we continue losing our land each time they clear boundaries”. 
 
On natural resources, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
of which Tanzania is a party says that, people have the right to dispose of their natural wealth: “All 
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice 
to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.” (Sic) (Part 1, Article 1) (www.hrweb.org/legal; p.1). 
Also, the Covenant recognizes three principles that have to be observed: All peoples have the 
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they can freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; all peoples may, for their own ends, 
freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of 
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. 
In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence; and the State Parties to the 
present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing 
and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect 
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations 
(www.hrweb.org/legal).  
Furthermore, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the United 
Nations’ General Assembly on December 10, 1948 has 30 articles on rights and freedoms of 
individuals and states in place (www.hrweb.org/legal).  UDHR is set to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms.  For example, articles 5 and 12 are against inhuman or degrading treatment of 
individuals and interference with privacy, family, or attacks upon humour respectively 
(www.hrweb.org/legal).  
In the case of Tanzania, the complicating factor is that individual rights to land are ambiguous 
(Ikdahl 2007). In a dissertation on the politics of land in Tanzania, Geir Sundet argues that, while 
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settlers held land under statutory law in the colonial period, customary use of land was never seen as 
ownership of land: 
 
“The Africans held their land under ‘customary law’, and their deemed Rights of 
Occupancy were permissive rights which were seen to be actively ‘provided’ and 
guaranteed by the government rather than being indisputable rights held by smallholders 
and pastoralists in their own right” (Sundet 1997:135). 
 
Sundet’s analysis shows that central tenets of land policy have remained “virtually unaltered 
since the colonial period” (Sundet 1997:134). While the new land laws (Land Act, 1999 and Village 
Land Act, 1999) appear to be radical, there are provisions, which allow the government to disregard 
customary rights when there are alternative usages that may contribute to “development”, like large-
scale mining. 
The forceful relocation of Ikoga and Idunda residents was meant to annex Ihefu wetland to 
Ruaha National Park. According to the victims, they were given a short notice (one month) to shift to 
earmarked areas (e.g. ≈ 200 km from Ikoga to Ikoga Mpya), they were paid unfair compensation 
(between less than Tzs 1 Million (< US $ 900) and Tzs 10 Million (US $ 9000) (1 US $ = 1,000 Tzs, 
January 2008), children stopped going to school, and they were no longer involved in economic 
activities due to lack of land suitable for farming and/or fear of further eviction (Idunda villagers) 
(Table 3). About 94% of Ikoga and Idunda residents had received compensation but, 60% of them 
received less than Tzs. 1 million (< US $ 900). In addition, the resettled residents at Ikoga Mpya were 
living in pathetic conditions (Fig. 1a & 1b). 
 
 
Fig. 1a: New residential area for one of the evicted household at Ikoga Mpya (new Ikoga) village 
   (Photo taken by Mrisho Malipula on 14
th
 September, 2008) 
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Fig. 1b: Recently evicted Ikoga Mpya (new Ikoga) residents at the village multi-purpose shop which is 
under a tree. Different products of beverages are sold as some residents are seen enjoying beer 
and local brew. (Photo taken by Mrisho Malipula on 14th September, 2008) 
 
Despite the fact that there are recognised avenues for lodging complaints, viz: appeal 
committee comprising of district land officer, ward councillors, land valuer, district legal officer and 
village leaders, the practice suggests that little is added to the complainants because most of the 
victims are not complaining on basis of law but their intuitions and standards. Due to this most 
villagers lack trust in the complaint process. Probably an independent team could ensure objectivity 
and trust on part of the victims. This is because some of the people in the appeal committee 
participated in the evaluations that resulted into the meagre compensation the evictees received.  
During informal discussions with some victims of the eviction at Idunda and Ukwaheri, they 
were bitter on the government’s decision to forcefully relocate them. For instance, two class seven 
pupils at Idunda Primary School had this to say: 
“Teaching stopped long time ago. Recently the teachers came and taught for four days and left, 
but we are supposed to sit for the national examination in September. What do you expect? …  
The government has been unfair to us and we have lost direction. For almost a year teachers 
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have not been teaching; most of the teachers have been transferred but we would have liked to 
be like you…” 
A wife (and mother) and husband had this to say regarding the eviction and compensation: 
 
“We were paid Tzs 600,000 (US $ 540). We had three hectares of land on which we grew rice 
and three for maize. Also, we had five grass-thatched houses. Now we sleep outside except our 
children who sleep in that temporary shelter (Fig. 1a). There is no infrastructure in place, e.g., 
water, schools, shops, dispensary, farms etc. The place is waterlogged, and my daughter, who 
is now in class four, is no longer attending school because the nearest school is at Luhanga, 
about 12 km from here…”  
 
Another resident accused the District Commissioner (DC) for harassment and for giving 
priority to wildlife than to people’s livelihoods. He said “The DC is harassing us with harsh words 
such as ‘Are you still here? I will send my dogs (militia men) to evict you by force, if you don’t move 
by 15/8/2008’”. 
The comments above are a testimony that the eviction/forced relocation was contrary to earlier 
promises by government to pay them appropriate compensations and putting basic infrastructure at the 
earmarked places before relocating them. One could argue that, this was violation of human rights.   
On the district administration side, district leaders, i.e. DC and District Executive Director 
(DED) for Mbarali had the following opinions:     
“The purpose of evicting people was to ensure that the number of livestock in Ihefu wetland is 
reduced in order to mitigate environmental degradation. The area is known as the country’s 
water plate and is a very important water source for Mtera Dam - the source of electric power 
in the country. Before the move started in 2000 there were 271 pastoralists in the area and 
most of them came from dry areas of the country and some had herds of cattle ranging from 
300-10,000. Apart from causing environmental degradation they also started killing people in 
neighbouring villages and one gun belonging to the Police force was snatched during the 
chaos”. Hon. Hawa Ngulume, DC, Mbarali - 20 August 2008  
 
“…Msangaji (Ikoga) villagers have already been paid compensation and were relocated to 
Ikoga Mpya, near Madibira village. Some of the locals have already moved to the area and/or 
built houses. There is yet no infrastructure in place and compensation made for infrastructure 
was not realistic. The task of developing social infrastructure was assigned to TANAPA. So far 
about Tzs. 212 Million (US $ 212,000) have been paid to the relocated people. An outdated 
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compensation law (the Land Compensation Act, 1973) was used in paying the victims.” Mr. 
Mhecha, DED, Mbarali - 20 August 2008. 
 
3.4. Political Ideology and Conservation 
The authors investigated whether political ideology or politicisation had any influence in 
conservation. In this article politicisation refers to the extensive inclusion of politicians, political 
institutions and political actions in influencing, determining and shaping conservation activities and 
particularly trade-offs. Overall, in the four study villages combined, the majority (67%) had the 
opinion that, political ideology inclination has little influence in conservation issues (Fig. 2). The 
minority believed, however, that political ideology could influence human rights awareness raising 
among the communities; could help in political system check-up; and could make the government 
active.  The majority (72.5%) of questionnaire survey respondents in villages adjacent to Saadani 
National Park believed that political ideology had no role in conservation. The figure for Ruaha 
National Park (Ihefu wetland) was relatively lower but still a majority (61.5%).  The authors believe 
that presence of people with different political affiliations could act as checks and balances in 
conservation and development trade-offs. During a discussion with the Mbarali DC, she blamed 
opposition parties for mobilizing people not to accept the relocation. According to local communities 
the socio-political implications of eviction include failure to provide social amenities to victims, low 
level of literacy and low level of participation in decision making.  
 
 
           Fig. 2. Influence of political ideology in conservation 
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Legal framework and conservation 
The Legal and Regulatory Framework need to encompass issues and priorities related to 
creating enabling environment for implementation of institutional change, decentralization, 
privatisation, gender-sensitive participatory management and biodiversity conservation. In Tanzania, 
there is inadequate legal framework for gender-balanced participation in natural resource conservation. 
This has contributed to low motivation in local communities to effectively participate in management 
of government-owned protected areas. Sharing of responsibilities in natural resource conservation has 
become eminent. Formal mechanisms for sharing benefits are needed as well.  Also needed is 
harmonization of policies and laws to remove overlaps and conflicts such as those related to mining, 
wildlife management, agricultural development and forest-related trade.  
Respondents were probed whether they were aware of conservation-related legislation and/or 
customary conservation rules and regulations. Overall, in the four study villages combined, a small 
proportion (46%) claimed to be aware of conservation-related legislation. However, when asked to 
mention them, they mentioned village by-laws, e.g. control of wildfires, restriction on cutting trees etc. 
This scenario is a challenge to government to ensure that conservation policies and laws are accessible 
(in a user friendly language) to communities adjacent to protected areas, that there is provision for 
rational and/or meaningful compensation and that social amenities are in place before any relocation is 
effected. This will enable local communities to understand their rights and obligations related to 
conservation issues. During the study the wildlife laws could not be accessed at local level.  
 
Winners and losers in conservation and development 
In addressing key issues within the study areas, viz: protection of biodiversity, preservation of 
the Great Ruaha River and conservation of Usangu wetlands (of which Ihefu wetland is part) losers 
and winners are inevitable. Both winners and losers are at all levels, from local to national as indicated 
in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Matrix of winners and losers in conservation and development 
Study area Core issues Winners  Losers  
Saadani National 
Park (Matipwili and 
Mkwaja) 
 
Protection of 
biodiversity 
 
TANAPA, central 
government (MNRT), 
tourists (local and 
international), 
conservation 
agencies/organisation, 
global community 
(e.g. carbon 
sequestration), 
Fishermen, farmers, 
pastoralists 
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District Councils 
Ruaha National 
Park/Usangu 
wetlands (Idunda 
and Ikoga Mpya) 
 
Preservation of 
Great Ruaha River 
 
TANESCO, 
TANAPA, central 
government (MNRT, 
MWI), tourists (local 
and international), 
District Councils 
 
Farmers (rice), 
pastoralists, 
fishermen, 
horticultural crops 
producers, central 
government (MoA) 
 Conservation of 
Usangu wetlands 
 
Central government 
(MWI), TANESCO, 
tourists (local and 
international), 
conservation 
NGO/CBO 
Farmers, 
pastoralists, 
horticultural 
producers, central 
government  
MoA=Ministry of Agriculture; MNRT=Ministry of Natural Resources & Tourism; MWI=Ministry of Water & Irrigation; 
TANAPA=Tanzania National Parks; TANESCO=Tanzania Electric Supplies Company; NGO=Non-Governmental 
Organisation CBO=Community-Based Organization 
 
4. Conclusions 
In conservation and development trade-offs, politics has a role to play and there are winners 
and losers. In the process of achieving conservation and development goals hard choices need to be 
made. The authors recommend: regular review of laws related to natural resource conservation and 
compensation; sincerity in implementing the bottom-up approach, e.g. in formulation and 
implementation of conservation-related policies and/or legislation; to reduce powers of the President 
related to land tenure issues, e.g. the power to transfer any area of village land to general or reserved 
land for public interest; involvement of local communities in major decisions, which impact on their 
livelihood; and capacity building for local leaders and people on conservation matters and trade-off 
negotiations. 
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